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Abstract
We study the strategic aspects of social influence in a society of agents linked by a
trust network, introducing a new class of games called games of influence. A game
of influence is an infinite repeated game with incomplete information in which, at
each stage of interaction, an agent can make her opinions visible (public) or invis-
ible (private) in order to influence other agents’ opinions. The influence process is
mediated by a trust network, as we assume that the opinion of a given agent is only
affected by the opinions of those agents that she considers trustworthy (i.e., the
agents in the trust network that are directly linked to her). Each agent is endowed
with a goal, expressed in a suitable temporal language inspired from linear tem-
poral logic (LTL). We show that games of influence provide a simple abstraction
to explore the effects of the trust network structure on the agents’ behaviour, by
considering solution concepts from game-theory such as Nash equilibrium, weak
dominance and winning strategies.
1 Introduction
At the micro-level, social influence can be conceived as a process where an agent forms
her opinion on the basis of the opinions expressed by other agents in the society. Social
influence depends on trust since an agent can be influenced by another agent, so that
her opinions are affected by the expressed opinions of the other, only if she trusts her.
At the macro-level, social influence is the basic mechanism driving the diffusion of
opinions in human societies: certain agents in the society influence other agents in
the society towards a given view, and these agents, in turn, influence other agents to
acquire the same view, and so on. In other words, social influence can be seen as
the driving force of opinion diffusion in human and human-like agent societies. This
view is resonant of existing studies in social sciences and social psychology which
∗This work was partially supported by Labex CIMI (ANR-11-LABX-0040-CIMI), within the program
ANR-11-IDEX-0002-02.
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emphasize the role of interpersonal processes in how people construe and form their
perceptions, judgments, and impressions (see, e.g., [1, 9, 15]).
Recent work in multi-agent systems [18, 12] proposed a formal model of opinion
diffusion that combined methods and techniques from social network analysis with
methods and techniques from belief merging and judgment aggregation. The two mod-
els aim at studying how opinions of agents on a given set of issues evolve over time
due to the influence of other agents in the population. The basic component of these
models is the trust network, as it is assumed that the opinions of a certain agent are
affected only by the opinions of the agents that she trusts (i.e., the agents in the trust
network that are directly linked to her). Specifically, the opinions of a certain agent at
a given time are the result of aggregating the opinions of the trustworthy agents at the
previous time.
In this work we build on these models to look at social influence from a strategic
perspective. We do so by introducing a new class of games, called games of influence.
Specifically, a game of influence is an infinite repeated game with incomplete infor-
mation in which, at each stage of interaction, an agent can make her opinions visible
(public) or invisible (private) to the other agents. Incompleteness of information is de-
termined by the fact that an agent has uncertainty about the private opinions of the other
agents, as she cannot see them. At each stage of the game, every agent is influenced
by the public opinions of the agents she trusts (i.e., her neighbors in the trust network)
and changes her opinions on the basis of the aggregation criterion she uses.
Following the representation of agents’ motivations given in [14], in a game of
influence each agent is identified with the goal that she wants to achieve. This goal
is represented by a formula of a variant of linear temporal logic (LTL), in which we
can express properties about agents’ present and future opinions. For example, an
agent might have the achievement goal that at some point in the future there will be
consensus about a certain proposition p (i.e., either everybody has the opinion that p
is true or everybody has the opinion that p is false), or the maintenance goal that two
different agents will always have the same opinion about p.
Games of influence provide a simple abstraction to explore the effects of the trust
network structure on the agents’ behaviour. We consider solution concepts from game-
theory such as Nash equilibrium, weak dominance and winning strategies. For in-
stance, in the context of games of influence, we can study how the relative position of
an agent in the trust network determines her influencing power, that is, her capacity to
influence opinions of other agents, no matter what the others decide to do (which cor-
responds to the concept of uniform strategy). Moreover, in games of influence one can
study how the structure of the trust network determines existence of Nash equilibria,
depending on the form of the agents’ goals. For instance, we will show that if the trust
network is fully connected and every agent wants to reach a consensus about a certain
proposition p, then there always exists a least one Nash equilibrium.
Related work and paper outline
Apart from the above mentioned work on opinion diffusion via judgment aggrega-
tion [12] and belief merging [18], there is a vast interest in providing formal models
of social influence. The most relevant is probably the work of Gosh and Vela´zquez-
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Quesada [10], which does not however consider strategic aspects in their preference
update model. The Facebook logic introduced by Seligman et al. [19] is also rele-
vant, and motivated our effort in Section 4 to get rid of epistemic operators in the goal
language. The difference between private and public information is reminiscent of the
work of Christoff and Hansen [6, 7], which also does not focus on strategic aspects.
A related problem to opinion diffusion is that of information cascades and knowledge
diffusion, which has been given formal treatment in a logical settings [16, 2]. Finally,
our work is greatly indebted to the work of [14], since an influence game can be con-
sidered as a variation of an iterated boolean game in which individuals do not have
direct power on all the variables – there can be several individuals influencing another
one – but concurrently participate in its change. Finally, [20] recently presented an
extension of iterated boolean games with a social network structure in which agents
choose actions depending on the actions of those in their neighbourhood.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic definition of private
and public opinions, as well as our model of opinion diffusion. In Section 3 we present
our language for goals based on an epistemic version of LTL, and we show that both
the model-checking problem remains in PSPACE (as for LTL), by showing a reduction
of the epistemic operator. Section 4 introduces the definition of influence games, and
presents the main results about the effects of the network structure on solution concepts
such as Nash equilibria and winning strategy, and on the complexity of checking that a
given profile of strategies is a Nash equilibrium. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Opinion diffusion
In this section we present the model of opinion diffusion which is the starting point of
our analysis. We generalise the model of propositional opinion diffusion introduced in
related work [12] by separating private and public opinions, and adapting the notion of
diffusion through aggregation to this more complex setting.
2.1 Private and public opinions
Let I = {p1, . . . , pm} be a finite set of propositions or issues and let N = {1, . . . , n}
be a finite set of individuals or agents. Agents have opinions about all issues in I in
the form of a propositional evaluations, or, equivalently, a vector of 0s and 1s:
Definition 1 (private opinion). The private opinion of agent i is a function Bi : I →
{1, 0} where Bi(p) = 1 and Bi(p) = 0 express, respectively, the agent’s opinion that
p is true and the agent’s opinion that p is false.
For every J ⊆ N , we denote with BJ = Πi∈JBi the set of all tuples of opinions
of the agents in J . Elements of BJ are denoted by BJ . For notational convenience, we
write B instead of BN , and Bi instead of B{i}.
Let B = (B1, . . . , Bn) denote the profile composed by the individual opinion of
each agent. Propositional evaluations can be used to represent ballots in a multiple
referendum, expressions of preference over alternatives, or value judgements over cor-
related issues (see, e.g., [5, 11]). Depending on the application at hand, an integrity
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constraint can be introduced to model the propositional correlation among issues. For
the sake of simplicity in this paper we do not assume any correlation among the issues,
but the setting can easily be adapted to this more general framework.
We also assume that each agent has the possibility of declaring or hiding her private
opinion on each of the issues.
Definition 2 (visibility function). The visibility function of agent i is a map Vi : I →
{1, 0} where Vi(p) = 1 and Vi(p) = 0 express, respectively, the fact that agent i’s
opinion on p is visible and the fact that agent i’s opinion on p is hidden.
We denote with V = (V1, . . . , Vn) the profile composed of the agents’ visibility
functions. By combining the private opinion with the visibility function of an agent we
can build her public opinion as a three-valued function on the set of issues.
Definition 3 (public opinion). LetBi be agent i’s opinion and Vi her visibility function.
The public opinion induced by Bi and Vi is a function Pi : I → {1, 0, ?} such that
Pi(p) =
{
Bi(p) if Vi(p) = 1
? if Vi(p) = 0
For every J ⊆ N , we denote with PJ = Πi∈JPi the set of all tuples of public opin-
ions of the agents in J . Elements ofPJ are denoted by PJ . For notational convenience,
we write P instead of PN , and Pi instead of P{i}.
Once more, P = (P1, . . . , Pn) denotes the profile of public opinions of all the
agents inN . Pi is aimed at capturing the public expression of i’s view about the issues
in I. Observe that an agent can only hide or declare her opinion about a given issue, but
is not allowed to lie. Relaxing this assumption would actually represent an interesting
direction for future work.
2.2 Information states
The information contained in a profile of public opinions can also be modelled using a
state-based representation and an indistinguishability relation, in line with the existing
work on interpreted systems (see, e.g., [8]). States will form the building blocks of our
model of strategic reasoning in opinion dynamics.
Definition 4 (state). A state is a tuple S = (B,V ) where B is a profile of private
opinions and V is a profile of visibility functions. The set of all states is denoted by S.
The following definition formalises the uncertainty between states induced by the
visibility functions. The idea is that an agent cannot distinguish between two states if
and only if both the agent’s individual opinion and the other agents’ public opinions
are the same according to the two states.
Definition 5 (Indistinguishability). Let S, S′ ∈ S be two states. We say that agent i
cannot distinguish between them, denoted by S ∼i S′, if and only if:
• Bi = B′i,
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• V = V ′ and
• for all j ∈ N \ {i} and for all p ∈ I, if Vj(p) = 1 then Bj(p) = B′j(p).
Let S∼i = {S′ ∈ S | S ∼i S′} be the set of states that agent i cannot distinguish
from S. Clearly∼i is an equivalence relation. In what follows we will often use public
states to represent the equivalence class of a state. Observe however that this is a too
coarse representation, since each of the agents knows her own belief.
Example 1. Let there be three agents i, j and k, and one issue p. Assume that
agents j and k consider p as true as private opinion while i private opinion is
p = 0. Suppose also that agents i and j make their opinion public while agent k
does not. From the perspective of agent i, the two states S0 = ((0, 1, 0), (1, 1, 0)) and
S1 = ((0, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0)) are indistinguishable, representing the two possible opinions
of agent k who is hiding it. Figure 1 represents the perspective of agent i.
S0
Bi(p) = 0
Bj(p) = 1
Bk(p) = 0
S1
Bi(p) = 0
Bj(p) = 1
Bk(p) = 1
i
Figure 1: Indistinguishable states for i as k hides p.
2.3 Opinion diffusion through aggregation
In this section we define the influence process that is at the heart of our model. Our
definition is a generalisation of the model by [12].
First, we assume that individuals are connected by an influence network which we
model as a directed graph:
Definition 6 (influence network). An influence network is a directed irreflexive graph
E ⊆ N ×N . We interpret (i, j) ∈ E as “agent j is influenced by agent i”.
We also refer to E as the influence graph and to individuals in N as the nodes of
the graph. Let Inf (j) = {i ∈ N | (i, j) ∈ E} be the set of influencers of agent j in
the network E. Given a state S, this definition can be refined by considering the set
Inf S(i, p) = {j ∈ N | (j, i) ∈ E and Pj(p) 6= ?} to be the subset of influencers that
are actually expressing their private opinion about issue p. Clearly, Inf S(i, p) ⊆ Inf (i)
for all p and S.
Example 2. Figure 2 represents a basic influence network where some agent i is influ-
enced by two agents j and k. The set Inf (i) = {j, k}, and, using the notation in the
previous example, the set Inf S0(i, p) = Inf S1(i, p) = {j}.
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i kj
Figure 2: i influences by j and k.
Given a profile of public opinions and an influence network E, we model the pro-
cess of opinion diffusion by means of an aggregation function, which shapes the private
opinion of an agent by taking into consideration the public opinions of her influencers.
Definition 7 (Aggregation procedure). An aggregation procedure for agent i is a class
of functions
Fi : B × PJ −→ B for each J ⊆ N \ {i}
that maps agent i’s individual opinion and the public opinions of a set of agents J to
agent i’s individual opinion.
Aggregation functions are used to construct the new private opinion of an agent in
the dynamic process of opinion diffusion. Thus, Fi(Bi,P Inf (i)) represents the private
opinion of agent i updated with the public opinions received by its influencers.
A number of aggregation procedures have been considered in the literature on judg-
ment aggregation and can be adapted to our setting. Notable examples are quota rules,
where an agent changes her opinion if the amount of people disagreeing with her is
superior of a given quota (the majority rule is such an example). These aggregation
procedures give rise to the class of threshold models studied in the literature on opin-
ion diffusion [13, 17].
For the sake of simplicity in this paper we consider that all agents use the following
aggregation procedure:
Definition 8. Let S = (B,V ) be a state and P the corresponding profile of public
opinions. The unanimous issue-by-issue aggregation procedure is defined as follows:
FUi (Bi,P )(p) =

Bi(p) if Inf S(i, p) = ∅
x ∈ {0, 1} if Pj(p) = x ∀j ∈ Inf S(i, p)
Bi(p) otherwise
That is, an individual will change her private opinion about issue p if and only if all
her influencers that are expressing their opinion publicly are unanimous in disagreeing
with her own one.
2.4 Strategic actions and state transitions
Showing or hiding information is a key action in the model of opinion diffusion defined
above. The dynamic of opinion is rooted in two dimensions: the influence network and
the visibility function. At each time step, by hiding or revealing their opinions, agents
influence other agents opinions. We assume that agents can make their opinions visible
or invisible by specific actions of type reveal(p) (i.e., action of making the opinion
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about p visible) and hide(p) (i.e., action of hiding the opinion about p). The action of
doing nothing is denoted by skip. Let therefore
A ={reveal(p) : p ∈ I} ∪ {hide(p) : p ∈ I} ∪ {skip}
be the set of all individual actions and J = An the set of all joint actions. Elements of
J are denoted by a = (a1, . . . , an).
Each joint action a induces a transition function between states. This function is
deterministic and is defined as follows:
Definition 9 (transition function). The transition function succ : S × J −→ S as-
sociates to each state S and joint action a a new state S′ = (B′,V ′) where, for all
i ∈ N :
• V ′i (p) =

1 if ai = reveal(p) or
0 if ai = hide(p) or
Vi(p) if ai = skip
• B′i = F
U
i (Bi,P
′
Inf (i))
Where P ′ is the public profile obtained from private profile B and visibility func-
tions V ′.
By a slight abuse of notation we denote with a(S) the state succ(S,a) obtained
from S and a by applying the transition function. Observe that in our definition of
transition function we are assuming that the influence process occurs after that the
actions have modified the visibility of the agents’ opinions. Specifically, first, actions
have consequences on the visibility of the agents’ opinions, then, each agent modifies
her private opinions on the basis of those opinions of other agents that have become
public.
We are now ready to define the concept of history, describing the temporal aspect
of agents’ opinion dynamic:
Definition 10 (history). Given a set of issues I, a set of agents N , and aggregation
procedures Fi over a network E, an history is an infinite sequence of states H =
(H0, H1, . . .). such that for all t ∈ N there exists a joint action at ∈ J such that
Ht+1 = at(Hn).
Let H = (H0, H1, . . .) be an history. For notational convenience, for any i ∈ N
and for any t ∈ N, we denote with HBi,t agent i’s private opinion in state Ht and with
HVi,t agent i’s visibility function in state Ht.
The set of all histories is denoted by H. Observe that our definition restricts the
set of all possible histories to those that corresponds to a run of the influence dynamic
described above.
Example 3. Let us reconsider the two previous examples, with initial state H0 =
S0. Consider now the following joint actions a0 = (skip, skip, reveal(p)) and a1 =
(skip, hide(p), skip): agent k reveals her opinion, and at the next step j hides her
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opinion about p. If we assume that all individuals are using the unanimous aggregation
procedure then Figure 3 shows the two states H1 and H2 constructed by applying the
two joint actions from state S0. In state H1, agent i’s private opinion about p has
changed, i.e., HBi,1(p) = 1 as all her influencers are publicly unanimous about p. At
the next step, instead, no opinion is updated.
((0, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0))
H0
((1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1))
H1
((1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1))
H2
a0 a1
Figure 3: The initial two states of a history.
3 Temporal and Epistemic Goals
As agents can hide or reveal their opinions, the strategic dimension of opinion diffu-
sion is immediate: by revealing/hiding her opinion, an agent influences other agents.
Influence is actually guided by some underlying goals. An agent reveals/hides her
opinion only if she wants to influence some other agents: she aims at changing indi-
vidual opinions. Temporal dimension is immediate as the dynamics of opinion has to
be considered. Following [14], we define a language to express individual epistemic
goals about the state of the individual opinions.
3.1 Epistemic temporal logic of influence
Let us introduce a logical language based on a combination of simple version of multi-
agent epistemic logic and linear temporal logic (LTL) that can be interpreted over histo-
ries. In line with our framework, term epistemic state should be interpreted as private
opinion. Goals in our perspective consists of targeting an epistemic state: typically
‘’agent i wants that agent j has private opinion ϕ in the future”. The proposed lan-
guage does not allow the temporal operator to be in the scope of a knowledge operator,
obtaining a simpler language and a reduction that allows us to stay in the same com-
plexity class as LTL.
We call ELTL–I this logic, from epistemic linear temporal logic of influence. Its
language, denoted by LELTL–I, is defined by the following BNF:
α ::= op(i, p) | vis(i, p) | ¬α | α1 ∧ α2 | Kiα
ϕ ::= α | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | Xϕ | ϕ1Uϕ2
where i ranges over N and p ranges over I. op(i, p) has to be read “agent i’s opinion
is that p is true” while ¬op(i, p) has to be read “agent i’s opinion is that p is not true”
(since we assume that agents have binary opinions). vis(i, p) has to be read “agent i’s
opinion about p is visible”. Finally, Kiα has to be read “agent i knows that α is true”.
Xϕ and U are the standard LTL operators ‘next’ and ‘until’. In particular, Xϕ has
to be read “ϕ is going to be true in the next state” and ϕ1Uϕ2 has to be read “ϕ1 will
8
be true until ϕ2 is true”. As usual, we can define the temporal operators ‘henceforth’
(G) and ‘eventually’ (F) by means of the ‘until’ operator:
Gϕ =def ¬(⊤U¬ϕ)
Fϕ =def ¬G¬ϕ
The interpretation of LELTL–I-formulas relative to histories is defined as follows.
Definition 11 (Truth conditions). Let ϕ be a LELTL–I-formula, let H be a history and
let k ∈ N. Then:
H, k |= op(i, p) ⇔ HBi,k(p) = 1
H, k |= vis(i, p) ⇔ HVi,k(p) = 1
H, k |= Kiα ⇔ ∀H
′ ∈ H : if H(k) ∼i H ′(k) then
H ′, k |= α
H, k |= ¬ϕ ⇔ H, k 6|= ϕ
H, k |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ⇔ H, k |= ϕ1 and H, k |= ϕ2
H, k |= Xϕ ⇔ H, k + 1 |= ϕ
H, k |= ϕ1Uϕ2 ⇔ ∃k
′ ∈ N : (k ≤ k′ and H, k′ |= ϕ2 and
∀k′′ ∈ N : if k ≤ k′′ < k′ then H, k′′ |= ϕ1)
The operator Ki is rather peculiar, and should not be interpreted as a classical indi-
vidual epistemic operator. It mixes public and private opinions of our model. Operator
Ki reading is rather ”agent i is uncertain about other agents private opinion as this
opinion is not visible” and Kiα stands for agent i knows α despite this uncertainty.
The following proposition shows thatKi could also be formulated in terms of equiv-
alence between histories rather than in terms of equivalence between states. Its proof
is immediate from our definitions.
Proposition 1. Let H ∈ H and k ∈ N. Then
H, k |= Kiα iff ∀H ′ ∈ H : if H ∼i H ′ then H ′, k |= α
where H ∼i H ′ iff H(h) ∼i H ′(h) for all h ∈ N.
Example 4. Consider Figure 3, the following statement expresses that in state H0, it
is the case that in the future agent k knows agent i public opinion about p (as H∼k1 =
{H1}):
H, 0 |= F(Kk(op(i, p) ∧ vis(i, p)))
This example also shows how each ELTL–I statements can be used for represent-
ing individual goals. Hence, gathering individual goals lead to the construction of a
boolean game. Before detailing this aspect we conclude the section by exhibiting the
key results about model checking for the ELTL–I logic.
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3.2 Model checking
The aim of this section is to show that model checking for ELTL–I is as hard as model
checking for LTL. Recall that epistemic temporal logic has very high complexity [8].
We do so by reducing formulas containing an epistemic modality to propositional ones.
Lemma 5. The following formulas are valid in ELTL–I:
(i) Kiop(i, p)↔ op(i, p)
(ii) Kiop(j, p)↔ (op(j, p) ∧ vis(j, p)) if i 6= j
(iii) Kivis(j, p)↔ vis(j, p) for all j
(iv) Ki¬op(i, p)↔ ¬op(i, p)
(v) Ki¬op(j, p)↔ (¬op(j, p) ∧ vis(j, p)) if i 6= j
(vi) Ki¬vis(j, p)↔ ¬vis(j, p) for all j
sketch. Straightforward from Definition 5 and the interpretation of the Kip operator.
To show the right-to-left direction of (ii) and (v), suppose that op(j, p) is true at every
indistinguishable state for ∼i, i.e., that Kiop(j, p) is true. This implies that op(j, p) is
true in the current state. Moreover, if vis(j, p) is false, then by Definition 5 there would
be an indistinguishable state in which op(j, p) is false, contradicting the hypothesis.
We now show two distribution laws for the operator Ki with respect to conjunction and
negation:
Lemma 6. The following formulas are valid in ELTL–I:
(i) Ki(α1 ∧ α2)↔ (Kiα1 ∧ Kiα2) for all α1 and α2;
(ii) Ki(α1 ∨ α2)↔ (Kiα1 ∨ Kiα2) when α1 and α2 do not contain any occurrence
of the modality Kj for any j.
sketch. (i) and the right-to-left directions of (ii) are standard consequences of inter-
preting Kip over equivalence relations. We now prove the left-to-right direction of (ii)
by induction on the construction of a propositional formula.
Assume some historyH and state S and suppose that the left part holds. This means
that in all states ∈ S∼i , either α1 or α2 is true. If both statements contains vis(j, p) or
¬vis(j, p) then Definition 5 entails that right-to-left direction hold, since eitherα1 holds
in all states ∈ S∼i or α2 holds in all states ∈ S∼i . If α1 (respectively α2) contains
some statement op(i, p), then the right-to-left direction holds as α1 either holds in all
states ∈ S∼i or is false in all states. If it does not hold then α2 is considered in a similar
way to α1. Now suppose that α1 and α2 only contain statements of the form op(j, p)
s.t. it is always the case that j 6= i. Then there must exist j, p such that vis(j, p) = 1.
Otherwise, there exists a state S′ ∈ S∼i such that neither α1 or α2 hold (as all possible
indistinguishable states must be considered). In conclusion, the right-to-left direction
holds as either α1 (respectively α2) either holds in all states ∈ S∼i or it does not hold
in all states.
Finally, we reduce the nesting of the Kip operator:
Lemma 7. The following formulas are valid in ELTL–I:
(i) KiKiα↔ Kiα
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(ii) KiKjKiα ↔ KjKiα for all i 6= j, when α do not contain any occurrence of the
modality Kj for any j.
sketch. The proof of (i) is a standard consequence of using equivalence relations. To
prove (ii), let α be a propositional formula. Put first α in CNF and then distribute
by Lemma 6 the modalities over conjunction. We now prove that KiKjKiℓ ↔ KjKiℓ
where ℓ is a literal. If ℓ = (¬)vis(j, p), then by Lemma 5 both sides of the equivalence
reduce to (¬)vis(j, p). Suppose that ℓ = (¬)op(k, p) for some k ∈ N . If k 6= i, j
then by Lemma 5 we can reduce Kiℓ to ℓ ∧ vis(k, p), and then it is straightforward to
conclude by observing that Kiℓ ∧ vis(k, p)↔ ℓ ∧ vis(k, p) ∧ vis(k, p) which in turn is
equivalent to ℓ ∧ vis(k, p). The case of k = i and k = j is similar.
We are now ready to present an algorithm to translate a formula of ELTL–I into an
equivalent one without any occurrence of the Ki operator. Let an epistemic literal be a
formula of the form (¬)Kiℓ for i ∈ N and propositional literal ℓ.
Input: a formula ϕ ∈ LELTL–I
Output: a formula red(ϕ) ∈ LELTL–I with no epistemic operators
while there is an epistemic operator in ϕ outside an epistemic literal do
1. choose a subformula Kiα of ϕ such that α is without epistemic operators
and is not a propositional literal;
2. put α in negated normal form (NNF);
3. distribute Ki over ∧ and ∨ ;
end
4. Reduce the depth modalities with Lemma 7;
5. Reduce the atoms with Lemma 5 ;
Algorithm 1: Reduction of the epistemic operator
The following proposition guarantees that the translation defined is also polyno-
mial.
Lemma 8. Algorithm 1 terminates, red(ϕ) is polynomial in the size of ϕ, does not
contain epistemic operators, and is equivalent to ϕ.
Proof. Lines 3, 4 and 5 apply equivalences that are valid by Lemmas 5, 6 and 7 and
the fact that the following rule of replacement of equivalents is admissible in ELTL–I:
ψ1 ↔ ψ2
ϕ↔ ϕ[ψ1/ψ2]
The negated normal form of a propositional formula (treating epistemic literals as
propositional literals) is constructed by propositional equivalence and is polynomial in
the size of the initial formula. Finally, since the modal depth is limited by Lemma 7
to |N |, we add a maximum of |N | extra variables of the form vis(j, p) for some j and
some p to the translation of each epistemic literal.
Using Lemma 8, we are able to polynomially reduce every formula of the ELTL–I
to an equivalent formula of the fragment LTL–I whose language LLTL–I is defined by
the following BNF:
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ϕ ::= op(i, p) | vis(i, p) | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | Xϕ | ϕ1Uϕ2
where i ranges overN and p ranges over I. We first show the following:
Proposition 2. The model checking problem of LTL–I is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. To verify membership it is sufficient to note that LTL–I is a special instance
of LTL built out of the finite set of atomic propositions {op(i, p) : i ∈ N and p ∈
I} ∪ {vis(i, p) : i ∈ N and p ∈ I} and interpreted over a subset of the set of all
possible histories for this language. Since the model checking problem for LTL is in
PSPACE [21], the model checking problem for LTL–I should also be in PSPACE.
To check that model checking of LTL–I is PSPACE-hard we are going to consider
the following fragment of LLTL–I:
ϕ ::= vis(i, p) | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | Xϕ | ϕ1Uϕ2
where i ranges overN and p ranges over I.
It is straightforward to check that the set of histories H includes all possible inter-
pretations for this language which is nothing but the LTL language built out of the finite
set of atomic propositions {vis(i, p) : i ∈ N and p ∈ I}. Since the model checking for
LTL is is known to be PSPACE-hard [21], it follows that the model checking for LTL–I
is PSPACE-hard too.
We can now state the following theorem about complexity of model checking for
ELTL–I.
Theorem 1. The model checking problem of ELTL–I is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. By Proposition 2 we know that model checking for LTL–I is PSPACE-complete.
Every formula of ELTL–I can be reduced to an equivalent formula of polynomial size in
LTL–I by Lemma 8, showing membership in PSPACE of model checking for ELTL–I.
Since LTL–I is a sublogic of ELTL–I we also obtain PSPACE-hardness.
4 Games of influence
We are now ready to put together all the definitions introduced in the previous sections
and give the following definition:
Definition 12 (Influence game). An influence game is a tuple IG =
(N , I, E, Fi, S0, γ1, . . . , γn) whereN , I, E and S0 are, respectively, a set of agents, a
set of issues, an influence network, and an initial state, Fi are aggregation procedures,
one for each agent, and γi ∈ LELTL–I is agent i’s goal.
4.1 Strategies
The following definition introduces the concept of strategy. The standard definition
would call for a function that assigns in each point in time an action to each player. We
choose to study simpler state-based strategies:
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Definition 13 (strategy). A strategy for player i is a function that associates an action
to every information state, i.e., Qi : S → A such that Qi(S) = Qi(S′) whenever
S ∼i S′. A strategy profile is a tuple Q = (Q1, . . . ,Qn).
For notational convenience, we interchangeably use Q to denote a strategy profile
(Q1, . . . ,Qn) and the function Q : S −→ J such that Q(S) = a if and only if
Qi(S) = ai, for all S ∈ S and i ∈ N . As the following definition highlights, every
strategy profile Q combined with an initial state S0 induces a history:
Definition 14 (Induced history). Let S0 be an initial state and let Q be a strategy
profile. The history HS0,Q ∈ H induced by them is defined as follows:
H0(S0,Q) = S0
Hn+1(S0,Q) = succ(Sn,Q(Sn)) for all n ∈ N
4.2 Solution concepts
We start with the concept of winning uniform strategy. Intuitively speaking, Qi is
a winning uniform strategy for player i if and only if i knows that, by playing this
strategy, she will achieve her goal no matter what the other players will decide to do.
Definition 15 (Winning strategy). Let IG be an influence game and let Qi be a strategy
for player i. We say that Qi is a winning strategy for player i if and only if
HS0,(Qi,Q−i) |= γi (1)
for all profiles Q−i of strategies of players other than i. A winning strategy is called
uniform if (1) is true for all states S ∈ S∼i0 .
Observe that a winning strategy is not necessarily winning uniform, as the private
state of an agent is not necessarily accessible to the other players.
Example 9. Let Ann, Bob and Jesse be three agents. Let p be an issue, and suppose
that BAnn(p) = 1, BBob(p) = 0, BJesse(p) = 0. Ann influences Bob and Jesse, while
Bob influences Jesse as shown in the following picture:
Ann
Bob
Jesse
Suppose that the goal of Ann is FGop(Jesse, p). Her winning (uniform) strategy is
reveal(p) in all states: Bob will be influenced to believe p in the second stage, and
subsequently Jesse will also do so, since her influencers are unanimous (even if Bob
plays hide(p)).
As we will show in the following section, the concept of winning strategy is too
strong for our setting. Let us then define the less demanding notion of weak dominance:
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Definition 16. Let IG be an influence game and let Qi be a strategy for player i. We
say that Qi is a weakly dominant strategy for player i and initial state S0 if and only
if for all profiles Q−i of strategies of players other than i and for all strategies Q ′i we
have:
HS0,(Q′i,Q−i) |= γi ⇒ HS0,(Qi,Q−i) |= γi (2)
A weakly dominant strategy is called uniform if (2) is true for all initial states S ∈ S i0 .
Example 10. Let us go back to the previous example and suppose now that Ann still
believes p, but does not influence Jesse any longer. In this case, Ann does not have a
winning strategy: if neither Bob nor Jesse do not believe p, it is sufficient for Bob to
play reveal(p) to make sure that she will never satisfy her goal. However, the strategy
reveal(p) is a weakly dominant strategy for Ann.
Now let us consider the following concept of best response. Intuitively speaking,
Qi is a best response to Q−i if and only if player i knows that the worst she could
possibly get by playing Qi, when the others play Q−i, is better or equal to the worst
she could possibly get by playing a strategy different from Qi.
Definition 17 (Best response). Let IG be an influence game, let Qi ∈ Qi and let
Q−i ∈ Q−i. We say that Qi is a best response to Q−i wrt. initial state S0 if and only
if for all Q ′i ∈ Qi:
(∀S ∈ S∼i0 (HS,(Qi,Q−i) |= γi) or
(∃S, S′ ∈ S∼i0 HS,(Qi,Q−i) 6|= γi and HS′,(Q′i,Q−i) 6|= γi))
If we rephrase this definition through some utility notion, then we can consider a
fictitious utility Ui(S) = 1 for states S that satisfy the goal of agent i, and Ui(S) = 0
for states where the goal is not satisfied. In that case, our definition of best response
corresponds to minS∈S∼i
0
Ui(HS,(Qi,Q−i)) ≥ minS∈S∼i0 Ui(HS,(Q
′
i
,Q
−i
)). This defi-
nition is justified on the basis of the prudential criterion according to which, if an agent
does not have a probability distribution over the set of possible states, she should focus
on the worst possible outcome and choose the action whose worst possible outcome is
at least as good as the worst possible outcome of any other actions (see, e.g., [22, 3, 4]).
Definition 17 allow us to define the concept of Nash equilibrium for games with
incomplete information such as influence games:
Definition 18 (Nash equilibrium). Let IG be an influence game and let Q be a strategy
profile. Q is a Nash equilibrium if and only if, for all i ∈ N , Qi is a best response to
Q−i.
4.3 Influence network and solution concepts
In this section we show some preliminary results about the interplay between the net-
work structure and the existence of solutions concepts. In what follows we only con-
sider influence games where the aggregation function is the unanimous one (see Defi-
nition 8). In the interest of space, most proofs will only be sketched. Let us first give
the following:
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Definition 19. A goal γ is coherent with an initial state S0 in game IG if and only if
there exists a strategy profile Q inducing history H such that HS0,Q |= γ.
Clearly, if γi is not coherent with initial state S0, then all strategies for player i
are equivalent. The following lemma shows that visibility goals cannot be enforced by
means of a winning strategy:
Proposition 3. If γi entails one formula of the form vis(j, p), Kjop(i, p), or Xvis(j, p)
for j 6= i, with belief and visibility atoms eventually negated, then i does not have a
winning strategy.
To see this, consider that if an individual goal γi concerns the visibility of another
agent about a given issue p, then this second agent can always respond hide(p) and
make sure that γi is false.
Let us now introduce a simpler language for goals, in order to study the limitations
of considering winning strategies in this setting. Let LTL–IJ be the language of future
goals about a subset of agent J ⊆ N , which focuses on the future opinions of agents
in J without considering the visibility. This language is defined by the following BNF:
α ::= op(j, p) | ¬op(j, p) | α ∧ α
ϕ ::= Xα | Xϕ | Gϕ | Fϕ
where j ∈ J and p ranges over I.
Let us introduce some further notation. If i, j ∈ N we say that i controls j if either
Inf (j) = {j}, or for all paths l1, . . . , ln such that (li, li+1) ∈ E, l1 = i and ln = j, we
have that i controls each lk. We can now prove the following:
Proposition 4. If γi ∈ LTL–IJ then i has a winning strategy for all initial states S0 if
and only if i controls j for all j ∈ J .
Proof. One direction is easier: if i controls agent j, then her winning strategy is to
always play reveal(p) in case her goal is consistent with her opinion, e.g. if her goal is
op(j, p) and HBi,0(p) = 1. Otherwise always playing hide(p) guarantees that her goal
will be satisfied. Note that the consistency of γi is crucial here.
For the other direction, consider a network in which j has more than one influencer,
say k, which is however not controlled by i. A simple case study shows that there
always exists an initial state in which i does not have a winning strategy. For instance,
if γi = Xop(j, p), then in an initial state in which Bj(p) = 0 it is sufficient for agent k
to play reveal(p) to make sure that agent j never updates her belief, and hence that γi
will not be satisfied.
Proposition 4 shows that the concept of winning strategy is too strong in influence
games, as it can only be applied in situations in which an agent has exclusive control
over the opinion of another.
Let us now focus on a particular influence game, in which the agents’ goal is to
reach a consensus about p. That is, each agent i adopts the following goal:
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γ+i =def FX
∧
j 6=i
op(j, p)
 γ−i =def FX
∧
j 6=i
¬op(j, p)

Consensus means that the conjunction of each individual goal leads to a state where all
agents have p as opinion.
Theorem 2. If all agent i has the goal of consensus represented by γ+i (respectively
γ−i ), and the network E is fully connected, then for any initial state S0 there always ex-
ists a Nash equilibrium Q̂ such that H
S0,Q̂
|=
∧
i∈N γ
+
i (respectively, γ−i ). Moreover,
each strategy is weakly dominant.
Proof. Take an initial state S0 = (B,V ), and assume that all individuals have
goal γ+i . Consider the four possible states about p for agent i: either p is true
or false, and p is visible or not. Assume Bi(p) = 1, then, regardless of visibil-
ity, we show that strategy reveal(p) is weakly dominant. For all S ∈ S∼i0 , either
HS,(reveal(p),Q−i) |=
∧
j 6=i op(j, p) or HS,(reveal(p),Q−i) 6|=
∧
j 6=i op(j, p); for that
former case, definition of unanimity entails that HS,(skip,Q−i) 6|=
∧
j 6=i op(j, p) and
HS,(hide(p),Q−i) 6|=
∧
j 6=i op(j, p). In a similar way, we can show that strategy hide(p)
is a best response to any strategy Q−i if Bi(p) = 0. We then built up a strategy profile
Q̂ w.r.t. Bi: Qi = reveal(p) if Bi(p) = 1 otherwise Qi = hide(p), this strategy profile
is a Nash equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies.
Observe that if the network E is not fully connected this result does not hold since,
for instance, the opinion of an isolated agent cannot be changed. Let us now focus on
specific shapes of the influence graph where weakly dominant strategy exists. Those
strategies concern the sources the agents who have no influencers.
Theorem 3. If E is acyclic, I∗ is the set of sources, and S0 is coherent with
∧
i∗∈I∗ γi,
and each source influences only one individual, then for all i∗ there exists a weakly
dominant strategy.
sketch. If
∧
i∗∈I∗ γi∗ is coherent with S0 then there exists some induced history H by
some strategy Qc such that HS0,Qc |=
∧
i∗∈I∗ γi∗ . Consider a source i∗ and its goal
γi∗ . Subformulas of its goal refer to agents that it directly influences or not. In the
latter case all the strategies of the source will be equivalent (hence weak-dominant).
If they talk about the (only) individuals that is influenced by the source, then by the
monotonicity of the aggregation procedure it is weakly dominant to play reveal(p) if
the source goal is coherent with the source’s belief. And hide(p) otherwise. (A case
study is required to obtain the full proof).
This result, once more, shows the difficulty of playing an influence game. It is ac-
tually possible to exhibit examples of acyclic influence graphs with sources influencing
multiple agents where no weakly dominant strategies exist for these sources.
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4.4 Computational complexity
In this section we exemplify the use of ELTL–I and the complexity results presented
in Section 3 for the computation of strategic aspects of influence games. We do so by
providing a PSPACE algorithm to decide whether a strategy profile is a Nash equilib-
rium.
Let MEMBERSHIP(F) be the following problem: given as input a set of indi-
viduals N , issues I, goals γi for i ∈ N – which together with F form an influence
game IG – and a strategy profile Q, we want to know whether Q is a Nash equilibrium
of IG .
The algorithm presented in [14] in the setting of iterated boolean games cannot
be directly applied to our setting for two reasons. First, our histories are generated
by means of an aggregation function F that models the diffusion of opinions – i.e.,
agents have a concurrent control on a set of propositional variables. Second, not all
conceivable strategies are available to players, as we focus on state-based strategies.
We therefore begin by translating a state-based strategy in ELTL–I. Clearly, a con-
junction of literals α(S) can be defined to uniquely identify a state S: α(S) will specify
the private opinion of all individuals and their visibility function. Given action a, let
βi(a) =

Xvis(i, p) if a = reveal(p)
X¬vis(i, p) if a = hide(p)
⊤ if a = skip
We can now associate a ELTL–I formula to each strategy Qi:
τi(Qi) =def
∧
S∈S
α(S)→ βi(Qi(S))
If Q is a strategy profile, let τ(Q) =
∧
i∈N τi(Qi). We now need to encode
the aggregation function into a formula as well. Recall the unanimous issue-by-issue
aggregation function of Definition 8 and consider the following formulas unan(i, p):
X op(i, p)↔([ ∧
j∈Inf (i)
X¬vis(j, p) ∧ op(i, p)
]
∨
[ ∨
j∈Inf (i)
X vis(j, p) ∧
∧
j∈Inf (i)
(X vis(j, p)→ op(j, p))
]
∨
[ ∨
j,z∈Inf (i):
(X vis(j, p) ∧ X vis(z, p)∧
op(j, p) ∧ ¬op(j, p)) ∧ op(i, p)
])
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as well as the following formula unan(i,¬p):
X ¬op(i, p)↔([ ∧
j∈Inf (i)
X¬vis(j, p) ∧ ¬op(i, p)
]
∨
[ ∨
j∈Inf (i)
X vis(j, p) ∧
∧
j∈Inf (i)
(X vis(j, p)→ ¬op(j, p))
]
∨
[ ∨
j,z∈Inf (i):
(X vis(j, p) ∧ X vis(z, p)∧
¬op(j, p) ∧ op(j, p)) ∧ ¬op(i, p)
])
This formula ensures that if the influencers of agent i are unanimous, then agent i’s
opinion should be defined according to the three cases described in Definition 8. Recall
that, while actions take one time unit to be effectuated (hence the X operator in front
of vis(j, p)), the diffusion of opinions is simultaneous. Let now:
τ(FUi ) =def
∧
{i∈N|Inf (i) 6=∅}
∧
{p∈I}
(unan(i, p) ∧ unan(i,¬p))
This formula encodes the transition process defined by the opinion diffusion. τ(FUi )
is polynomial in both the number of individuals and the number of issues (in the worst
case it is quadratic in n and linear in m). We are now ready to prove the following
result:
Theorem 4. MEMBERSHIP(FUi ) is in PSPACE.
Proof. Let Q be a strategy profile for game IG . The following algorithm can be used
to check whether Q is a Nash equilibrium. For all individuals i ∈ N , we first check
the following entailment:
τ(Q) ∧ τ(Fi) |=LTL red(γi)
in the language of LTL built out the set of atomic propositions {op(i, p) : i ∈
N and p ∈ I} ∪ {vis(i, p) : i ∈ N and p ∈ I}, where red(γi) is defined as in Al-
gorithm 1 in Section 3.2.
If this is not the case, we consider all the possible strategies Q′i 6= Qi for agent i –
there are exponentially many, but each one can be specified in space polynomial in the
size of the input – and check the following entailment:
τ(Q−i, Qi) ∧ τ(Fi) |=LTL red(γi)
If the answer is positive we output NO, otherwise we proceed until all strategies
and all individuals have been considered. The entailment for LTL can be reduced to the
problem of checking validity in LTL. Indeed, the following equivalence holds:
ψ |=LTL ϕ iff |=LTL Gψ → ϕ
Since the problem of checking validity in LTL can be solved in PSPACE [21], we obtain
the desired upper bound.
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We conjecture that the problem is also PSPACE-complete, as a reduction in line
with the one by [14] is likely to be obtained.
Observe that Theorem 4 can easily be generalised to all aggregation procedures
that can be axiomatised by means of polynomially many ELTL–I formulas – with the
eventual use of Lemma 8 to translate ELTL–I-formulas in LTL. This is not the case for
all aggregation procedures: the majority rule – i.e., the rule that updates the opinion
of an individual to copy that of the majority of its influencers – would for instance
require an exponential number of formulas, one for each subset of influencers that
forms a relative majority. The study of the axiomatisation of aggregation procedures
for opinion diffusion constitutes a promising direction for future work.
5 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we proposed a model, inspired from related work on iterated boolean
games [14], that allows us to explore some basic aspects of strategic reasoning in so-
cial influence. We grounded our model on related work [18, 12], which modelled the
process of social influence by means of aggregation procedures from either judgment
aggregation or belief merging, and we augmented it with the introduction of a simple
logical language for the expression of temporal and epistemic goals. This allowed us to
inquire into the multiple aspects of the relation between the structure of the influence
network, and the existence of well-known game-theoretic solution concepts. Moreover,
we were able to show that model checking for our language, as well as the problem of
checking whether a given profile is a Nash equilibrium, is in PSPACE, hence no harder
than the linear temporal logic on which our language is based.
There are multiple directions in which this work can be expanded. First, the in-
troduction of extra actions to add or sever trust links may add an important dynamic
aspect to the network structure. Second, we may allow agents to lie about their private
preferences, hence providing them with more strategies to attain their goals. Third, to
develop our framework to its full generality we could introduce integrity constraints
among the issues at hand. In all these cases, a deeper study of the interconnection be-
tween the network structure and the strategies played by the agents of extreme interest,
and has the potential to unveil general insights about the problem of social influence.
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